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Nashville Ave. Wharf Facility

Parent Companies:
New Orleans Cold Storage
EPA Facility ID:
100000143882
Other ID:
Facility DUNS:
0
Parent Company DUNS:
8162380

Location:

Address:
Nashville Avenue Wharf
New Orleans, LA 70115
County:
ORLEANS
Lat / Long:
29.915, -90.126 (Get map)
Method:
Interpolation - Map
Description:
Center of Facility
Horizonal accuracy:
m
Horizontal reference datum:
Source map scale:

Owner/Operator:

Name:
New Orleans Cold Storage & Warehous
Phone:
(504) 895-4826
Address:
Nashville Avenue Wharf
New Orleans, LA 70115
Foreign Address:

Person responsible for RMP implementation:

Name:
Gary Escoffier
Title:
President
Email:

Emergency contact:

Name:
Ricky Calligan
Title:
Warehouse Manager
Phone:
(504) 895-4826
24-hour phone:
(504) 616-8889
Ext or PIN:
Email:

Other contacts:

Facility (or company) email:
Facility phone:
(504) 895-4826
Facility (or company) URL:

Safety:

Local Emergency Planning Committee:
Orleans Parish LEPC
Full-Time Equivalent Employees:
25
Covered by OSHA PSM:
Yes
EPCRA section 302:
Yes
CAA Title Air Operating Permit:
No
CAA Permit ID#:
OSHA Star/Merit Ranking
No
Last Safety Inspection Date:
Inspecting Agency:
Never had one
Using Predictive Filing:
No

Processes:

Refrigerated Storage
RMP ID:
22205
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Refrigerated Warehousing and Storage (49312)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Ammonia (anhydrous)
7664-41-7
19,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No

RMP Preparer:

Name:
Address:

,
Foreign Address:

Phone:

Latest RMP Submission:

Date:
Aug. 16, 1999
Type:
Correction of existing RMP
Reason:
Registered:
No
RMP ID:
16050

Deregistration:

Date:
Effective Date:
Reason:
Source terminated operations
Other Reason:

2. Toxics: Worst-case

Some Risk Management Plan information is not provided in the available RMP data. You need to make an appointment at an EPA Reading Room In order to get access to details from the Off-Site Consequence Analysis (OCA) such as:

Instructions on how to make an EPA appointment can be found here.

Public OCA Chemical (in Refrigerated Storage)
CBI claimed:
No
Percent weight:
100.0
Physical state:
Gas liquified by pressure
Model used:
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Release duration (mins):
10.00
Wind speed (meters per sec):
1.5
Stability class:
F
Topography:
Urban
Passive mitigation
considered:
  • Enclosures
not considered:
  • Dikes
  • Berms
  • Drains
  • Sumps

3. Toxics: Alternative release

Some Risk Management Plan information is not provided in the available RMP data. You need to make an appointment at an EPA Reading Room In order to get access to details from the Off-Site Consequence Analysis (OCA) such as:

Instructions on how to make an EPA appointment can be found here.

Public OCA Chemical (in Refrigerated Storage)
CBI claimed:
No
Percent weight:
Physical state:
Gas
Model used:
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Wind speed (meters per sec):
3.00
Stability class:
D
Topography:
Urban
Passive mitigation
considered:
  • Enclosures
not considered:
  • Dikes
  • Berms
  • Drains
  • Sumps
Active mitigation
considered:
  • Emergency shutdown
not considered:
  • Sprinkler systems
  • Deluge systems
  • Water curtain
  • Neutralization
  • Excess flow valve
  • Flares
  • Scrubbers

4. Flammables: Worst-case

None

5. Flammables: Alternative release

None

6. Five-year accident history

July 24, 1998 at 05:15
ID:
2204
NAICS:
Refrigerated Warehousing and Storage (49312)
Duration:
1 hours and 30 minutes
Chemicals involved:
  • Ammonia (anhydrous)
Release events:
Gas release
Weather conditions at time of event
Wind speed:
5.0 miles/h NW
Temperature:
80.00 ℉
Atmospheric stability:
D
Precipitation present:
No
Unknown weather conditions:
No
On-site impacts
Deaths of employees or contractors:
0
Deaths of public responders:
0
Deaths of public:
0
Injuries of employees or contractors:
0
Injuries of public responders:
0
Injuries of public:
0
Property damage:
$0
Known off-site impacts
Deaths:
0
Hospitalizations:
0
Medicals treatments:
0
Evacuated:
0
Sheltered-in-place:
100
Property damage:
$0
Environmental damage:
Initiating event:
Equipment Failure
Contributing factors:
  • Equipment failure
Off-site responders notified:
Notified and Responded
Changes introduced as a result of the accident:
  • Improved/upgraded equipment
  • Revised training
  • New process controls
  • Revised emergency response plan

7. Prevention: Program level 3

Refrigerated Storage, Refrigerated Warehousing and Storage (49312)
Prevention Program ID:
12111
Safety Review Date
June 1, 1999, since latest RMP submission
PHA Update Date
Feb. 1, 1997, since latest RMP submission
PHA Techniques
  • None
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Equipment failure
Process Controls
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Backup Pump
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • Enclosure
Monitoring Systems
  • Process Area
Changes since PHA
  • Process Detection
Training Type
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Oral Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
June 8, 1999, since latest RMP submission
Training Review Date
June 15, 1999, since latest RMP submission
Maintenance Review Date
June 8, 1999, since latest RMP submission
Maintenance Inspection Date
June 15, 1999, since latest RMP submission
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
April 15, 1999
Management of Change Review Date
April 1, 1999
Pre-startup Review Date
Feb. 1, 1997
Compliance Audit Date
None
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
None
Incident Investigation Date
July 24, 1998
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
July 1, 1999
Participation Plan Review Date
Feb. 1, 1997
Hot Work Review Date
Feb. 1, 1997
Contractor Safety Review Date
None, since latest RMP submission
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
None, since latest RMP submission

8. Prevention Program level 2

No Prevention Program level 2

9. Emergency response

Facility In Community Plan:
No
Facility Own Response Plan:
No
Specific Facility Response Plan:
Yes
Inform. Procedures in Response Plan:
No
Emergency Care in Response Plan:
Yes
Plan Review Date:
Response Training Date:
Jan. 15, 1999
Local Response Agency:
Local Response Agency Phone:
(504) 483-2550
Subject To - OSHA EAP:
No
Subject To - OSHA HAZWOPER:
Yes
Subject To - CWA:
No
Subject To - RCRA:
No
Subject To - OPA:
No
Subject To - State EPCRA:
No
Subject To - Other:

Executive Summary

Source and Process Description.

The main operation at New Orleans Cold Storage is the warehousing and distribution of frozen bulk foodstuff. The facility consists of several cold storage rooms that are cooled by a main refrigeration system. An additional "blast" unit is used to maintain one room at very low temperatures (-30 degrees F.)

Both refrigeration units utilize Anhydrous Ammonia (100% conc.) as the system coolant. The main refrigeration unit has a maximum capacity of 10,000 pounds of ammonia. The blast unit has a maximum capacity of 7,000 pounds. At this facility, both systems are independent.

Summary of Major Hazards.

The primary hazard associated with a release of Anhydrous Ammonia is exposure of persons and sensitive environmental areas to toxic levels of ammonia vapor. Anhydrous Ammonia is a toxic gas that is also a corrosive irritant to eyes, skin, respiratory tract and mucous membranes. Contact of evaporating liquid with skin will freeze the tissue, then produce a caustic burn. However, the burn hazard should be considered secondary to the toxic effects from exposure to the gas.

The toxic endpoint for Anhydrous Ammonia has been determined to be 200 parts per million (ppm). It is defined as the concentration that almost all persons can withstand for one hour without permanent adverse effects. However, aggravation of existing respiratory and skin diseases may occur at concentrations below the toxic endpoint.

Consequences of Failure to Control the Hazards.

Although the release of all the Anhydrous Ammonia (10,000 pounds) within a 10 minute period (considering a catastrophic failure of the main receiver) is extremely unlikely, these are the parameters used in the worst case scenario. In this case, the toxic endpoint was calculated to be 0.9 miles. Based on the population density of Orleans Parish (2751.6 persons/sq. mi.), the area within the toxic endpoint radius (2.54 sq. mi.) and the estimated percentage of that area that is residentia
l (20%), an estimated 1400 people reside within the vulnerable zone. Several schools and hospitals are located within the vulnerable zone.

The alternative scenario is based on an actual incident at another facility at which approximately 2,500 pounds of ammonia was released into a cold storage room. In this alternative scenario, 3,000 pounds of ammonia is released within 30 minutes. The toxic endpoint is calculated to be 0.1 miles. At this distance, the residential population is essentially zero.

There are no designated environmental management areas within the worst case vulnerable zone, however, the local zoo and adjacent park is within the vulnerable zone.

Explanation of How Releases are Prevented

The primary mitigation system for this facility is the Engine Room enclosure. Although a catastrophic release would have ample opportunity to be vented to the atmosphere, the engine room enclosure would provide a significant degree of isolation in the more likely release scenario. An active countermeasure to any leaks or releases is the ammonia sensors in the engine room. If ammonia is detected, an audible alarm is immediately sounded within the warehouse and an alert is sent to a 24 hour/day monitoring service.

Other process controls include automatic cut-off devices in the event of deviation from prescribed limits (pressure, temperature, process level, etc.), check valves and relief valves.

To further reduce the likelihood of an accidental release, an extensive inspection program has been established for all system components and operating parameters. This includes a daily inspection of compressors, pumps and associated equipment, and a weekly, monthly and annual inspection and maintenance schedule that is rigidly followed, ensuring a well-maintained physical plant.

All operating procedures have been recently reviewed/revised and all personnel responsible for the proper operation of the refrigeration units have received refresher training in the proc
edures. These elements of this program will further reduce the possibility of an accidental release caused by human error.

Steps Taken to Address Hazards.

The primary methods for generating recommendations are through periodic review and/or revision of Process Hazard Analyses (PHAs), incident investigations and operational procedures review (Management of Change). These reviews provide a means for continuous improvement.

As an example, in response to a recommendation from an incident investigation report from another facility, two sets of impervious body suits and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) are positioned at all NOCS facilities. All engineers are trained in the use of this equipment as an enhanced way of personnel rescue, release response and rapid control.

Response Action in the Event of a Release.

Upon initial discovery of a leak or release, whether by sensor and alarm or personnel, a rapid and decisive response is critical to minimizing the potential impacts to off-site populations and other sensitive areas. As noted above, on-site control and mitigation, along with personnel evacuation and accountability, is coupled with a rapid notification plan to bring in local and state agencies for assistance in the event the local population may potentially be affected.