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KIK Louisiana, Inc

Parent Companies:
KIK Corporation, Inc.
EPA Facility ID:
100000142507
Other ID:
Facility DUNS:
249112814
Parent Company DUNS:
254062136

Location:

Address:
646 Carnation Street
Slidell, LA 70406
County:
ST. TAMMANY
Lat / Long:
30.293, 89.784 (Get map)
Method:
Address Matching - Primary Name
Description:
Loading Facility
Horizonal accuracy:
m
Horizontal reference datum:
Source map scale:

Owner/Operator:

Name:
KIK Louisiana Inc.
Phone:
(985) 646-2400
Address:
646 Carnation Street
Slidell, LA 70406
Foreign Address:

Person responsible for RMP implementation:

Name:
Walt Berg
Title:
General Manager
Email:

Emergency contact:

Name:
Walt Berg
Title:
General Manager
Phone:
(985) 646-2400
24-hour phone:
(800) 476-0218
Ext or PIN:
Email:

Other contacts:

Facility (or company) email:
Facility phone:
Facility (or company) URL:

Safety:

Local Emergency Planning Committee:
St. Tammany Parish LEPC
Full-Time Equivalent Employees:
73
Covered by OSHA PSM:
Yes
EPCRA section 302:
No
CAA Title Air Operating Permit:
No
CAA Permit ID#:
OSHA Star/Merit Ranking
No
Last Safety Inspection Date:
June 14, 2000
Inspecting Agency:
State environmental agency
Using Predictive Filing:
No

Processes:

Bleach Manufacturing
RMP ID:
39503
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Soap and Other Detergent Manufacturing (325611)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Chlorine
7782-50-5
360,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No

RMP Preparer:

Name:
Address:

,
Foreign Address:

Phone:

Latest RMP Submission:

Date:
Feb. 3, 2003
Type:
Correction of existing RMP
Reason:
Registered:
Yes
RMP ID:
27472

Deregistration:

Date:
Effective Date:
Reason:
Other Reason:

2. Toxics: Worst-case

Some Risk Management Plan information is not provided in the available RMP data. You need to make an appointment at an EPA Reading Room In order to get access to details from the Off-Site Consequence Analysis (OCA) such as:

Instructions on how to make an EPA appointment can be found here.

Public OCA Chemical (in Bleach Manufacturing)
CBI claimed:
No
Percent weight:
Physical state:
Gas liquified by pressure
Model used:
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Release duration (mins):
10.00
Wind speed (meters per sec):
1.5
Stability class:
F
Topography:
Urban
Passive mitigation
considered:
  • Dikes
  • Enclosures
  • Berms
  • Drains
  • Sumps
not considered:
  • None

3. Toxics: Alternative release

Some Risk Management Plan information is not provided in the available RMP data. You need to make an appointment at an EPA Reading Room In order to get access to details from the Off-Site Consequence Analysis (OCA) such as:

Instructions on how to make an EPA appointment can be found here.

Public OCA Chemical (in Bleach Manufacturing)
CBI claimed:
No
Percent weight:
Physical state:
Gas
Model used:
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Wind speed (meters per sec):
12.50
Stability class:
D
Topography:
Urban
Passive mitigation
considered:
  • Dikes
  • Enclosures
  • Drains
  • Sumps
not considered:
  • Berms
Active mitigation
considered:
  • Neutralization
  • Excess flow valve
  • Scrubbers
  • Emergency shutdown
not considered:
  • Sprinkler systems
  • Deluge systems
  • Water curtain
  • Flares

4. Flammables: Worst-case

None

5. Flammables: Alternative release

None

6. Five-year accident history

No Registered Accidents

7. Prevention: Program level 3

Bleach Manufacturing, Soap and Other Detergent Manufacturing (325611)
Prevention Program ID:
22281
Safety Review Date
Dec. 18, 2000, since latest RMP submission
PHA Update Date
Dec. 18, 2000, since latest RMP submission
PHA Techniques
  • What if/Checklist
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Floods
  • Tornado
  • Hurricanes
Process Controls
  • None
Mitigation Systems
  • Sprinkler System
  • Dikes
  • Enclosure
  • Neutralization
Monitoring Systems
  • Process Area
  • Perimeter Monitors
Changes since PHA
  • None
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Nov. 27, 2000, since latest RMP submission
Training Review Date
Dec. 18, 2000, since latest RMP submission
Maintenance Review Date
Dec. 16, 2000, since latest RMP submission
Maintenance Inspection Date
March 16, 2002, since latest RMP submission
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
Nov. 20, 2002
Management of Change Review Date
Nov. 20, 2000
Pre-startup Review Date
Nov. 20, 2002
Compliance Audit Date
Dec. 19, 2000
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
March 30, 2001
Incident Investigation Date
None
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
March 25, 2002
Hot Work Review Date
Oct. 23, 2000
Contractor Safety Review Date
Oct. 14, 2000, since latest RMP submission
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Nov. 14, 2000, since latest RMP submission

8. Prevention Program level 2

No Prevention Program level 2

9. Emergency response

Facility In Community Plan:
Yes
Facility Own Response Plan:
No
Specific Facility Response Plan:
Yes
Inform. Procedures in Response Plan:
No
Emergency Care in Response Plan:
Yes
Plan Review Date:
Response Training Date:
Sept. 11, 2000
Local Response Agency:
Local Response Agency Phone:
(985) 847-2870
Subject To - OSHA EAP:
No
Subject To - OSHA HAZWOPER:
Yes
Subject To - CWA:
No
Subject To - RCRA:
No
Subject To - OPA:
No
Subject To - State EPCRA:
Yes
Subject To - Other:

Executive Summary

KIK Louisiana, Inc. is a manufucturer/packager and shipper of consumer household cleaning products for retail outlets. KIK also has a plastics blow molding operation, making all of their containers for their products. There are several chemicals stored in bulk at the facility; Caustic, Chlorine, and High Density Polyethylene. The finished products are typically stored in one (1) gallon or smaller polyethylene bottles, and packaged in cardboard cases for shipment to retail outlets. These cases are palletized for ease of handling and shipment. KIK has an on-site wastewater treatment facility for the management of miscellaneous aqueous streams.
The primary goal of the Risk Management Program is to prevent or reduce the risk of accidental releases of substances that might expose employees, the public, or the environment to the hazards of toxicity, tire or explosion. Our policy is to implement the prevention measures outlined in the Process Safety Management and Risk Management Program regulations by focusing on the standards, procedures and practices which govern individual processes, activities, or equipment. As with any prevention program, one of the most important barriers to an incident is the performance and conduct of our people in integrating program requirements and safe work practices in their daily activities.
The only regulated substance at the facility meeting the threshold quantity as determined under 68115 subject to the Risk Management Program is: Chlorine KIK Louisiana, Inc. receives 90 ton rail cars which are connected directly to the plant?s processing system. The maximum stored quantity of chlorine is 720,000 pounds (4 full tank cars).
The Offsite Consequence Analysis was conducted using EPA computer model ?*RMP*Comp?. The worse-case release scenario (as structured by the regulation) is the failure of a single tank car containing 180,000 pounds of chlorine with a 10 minute release. The probability of this scenario is extremely low based on the con
struction standards, safety features and rigorous inspection/testing programs that are incorporated into these tank cars. The most likely cause of a ruptured car would be the impact of a locomotive or another rail car. In order to prevent this from happening. KIK has a derailer in use at all times, except when spotting cars for delivery. During the delivery event, an operator is present to supervise the proper exchange of rail cars.
The monitors are made of an electrolytic cell design Spare cells are maintained at the facility. The monitors are located at each bleach unit, the two (2) rail car unloading stations and on the chlorine line near the middle of the length from the rail cars to the bleach unit, The chlorine monitor is colocated with the automatic shut-off valve, The other automatic shut off valves are located at the bleach unit and at the rail car station. The two (2) chlorine expansion chambers are located on the chlorine line on either side of the automatic shut-off valve. Another shut-off valve is going to be added by the door of the rail car unloading area for emergency responders. The monitors are set to activate the automatic shut-off valves and sound an alarm at or above a concentration of one (1) part per million (ppm) of chlorine, Each monitor at the rail cars and the monitor at the chlorine line are designed to shut down the system Scenario: If one (1) at a rail car senses chlorine at or above a concentration of one (1) ppm, the automatic shut-off valves activate at the rail car location and at the chlorine line. Scenario #2: The monitor at the bleach unit activates only the automatic shut-off valve at the bleach unit. The purpose of this arrangement is to take advantage of the expansion capacity of the rail car and the bleach unit.
The chlorine expansion chambers built into the chlorine line are provided to allow for gas expansion in the event of an automatic system shut down. Each chamber is seized to manage the chlorine gas contained wit
hin 250 feet of line. The devices have internal rupture discs to allow the gas into the chamber. Spare rupture discs are maintained on site.
The chlorine line/system is constructed of one (1) inch schedule 80 pipe. Three-hundred and fifty (350) pound fittings are used at all pipe junctures. The system operates at 110 to 120 pounds per square inch (psi). The piping is over the design specifications, to prevent any pipe or fitting failure. The entire system is inspected weekly and preventive maintenance is performed quarterly by qualified maintenance personnel.
The chlorine delivery tine is completely indoors, except for a short section between the building and the unloading connection. KIK also utilizes 2 heat exchangers to maintain over design specifications of the capacity on the system, exceeding Tier Two control requirements. Automatic high temperature shut are in place, in addition to redundant sensors and alarms. As an added safeguard, KIK employs local pressure indicators on the chlorine tank car and feed line. The Department of Transportation mandates in 49 CFR 179. 102 DOT specification 105A500w, that tank car is constructed of two steel shells. The internal shell is the pressure vessel holding the material and is to be constructed of a 1-11/16? with a minimum bursting pressure of l,250 pounds per square inch (49 CFR 179.l01-l). In subsequent tank testing, a pressure of 500 psi is to held by the tank car with ?no signs of leakage or distress? for a pealed of 10 minutes as set forth in 49 CFR 179.100-18. Between the internal shell and the external shell them must be a 4? minimum thickness of either cork board or 2? minimum of 4 lb/cubic foot dense polyurethane foam insulation (49 CFR 179.102.2). The external jacket is to be of not less than 11 gauge steel as set forth in 49 CPR 179. Safety valves are to have a maximum flow rating of 412 psi and be vapor tight at a minimum of 300 psi. The typical pressure used as padding by KIK is 120 psi. This padding pressur
e is significantly below the designed vapor pressure for the valves, Again, is over designed to insure employee and public safety.
KIK follows the procedures and safety measures recommended by the Chlorine Institute for the safe handling and use of chlorine. The facility has written procedures for the unloading of chlorine tank cars. The employees managing the chlorine unit are specifically trained in the proper connection and disconnection protocols for rail cars. A C-kit is on site in the event of a leaking valve or shipping container. The operators responsible for the chlorine system are trained annually by KIK?s vendor Occidenta in the proper usage of a C-kit.
The most catastrophic event that could occur at the KIK site is the rupture of a fully loaded 90 ton chlorine rail car, The most likely cause of a ruptured car would be the impact of a locomotive or other rail car. In order to prevent this, KIK has a derailer in use at alt times, except when spotting cars for delivery. During the delivery event, an operator is present to supervise the proper exchange of rail cars,
The most likely release event would involve the failure of an unloading line. If this were to occur and all active and passive systems failed; KIK personnel are trained to don proper PPE and manually shut the system down. The site has an audible alarm and a protocol to alert and protect the surrounding neighborhood, if such an incident were to occur,
KIK has been in operation at the Carnation Street Address since July of 1996. The site was previously owned by Labbco/Lastec. This site has been in operation, using chlorine as a raw product since 1990. There have been no mishaps regarding this process.