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Valero Benicia Refinery

Parent Companies:
Valero Refining Company ? CA
EPA Facility ID:
100000087871
Other ID:
94510XXNCS3400E
Facility DUNS:
0
Parent Company DUNS:
43652424

Location:

Address:
3400 East Second St
Benicia, CA 94510
County:
SOLANO
Lat / Long:
38.074, -122.144 (Get map)
Method:
Interpolation - Satellite
Description:
Administrative Building
Horizonal accuracy:
40 m
Horizontal reference datum:
North American Datum of 1983
Source map scale:

Owner/Operator:

Name:
Valero Refining Company - CA
Phone:
(707) 745-7011
Address:
3400 East Second St
Benicia, CA 94510 -1005
Foreign Address:

Person responsible for RMP implementation:

Name:
Elizabeth Crowley
Title:
Environmental Staff Engineer

Emergency contact:

Name:
Joe Bateman
Title:
Superintendent Emergency Services
Phone:
(707) 745-7011
24-hour phone:
(707) 745-7011
Ext or PIN:

Other contacts:

Facility (or company) email:
Facility phone:
(707) 745-7534
Facility (or company) URL:

Safety:

Local Emergency Planning Committee:
Region II LEPC
Full-Time Equivalent Employees:
450
Covered by OSHA PSM:
Yes
EPCRA section 302:
Yes
CAA Title Air Operating Permit:
Yes
CAA Permit ID#:
B2626
OSHA Star/Merit Ranking
Yes
Last Safety Inspection Date:
June 29, 2016
Inspecting Agency:
EPA
Using Predictive Filing:
Yes

Processes:

Tank Storage
RMP ID:
1000083550
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
150,000,000
No
Ammonia (conc 20% or greater)
7664-41-7
450,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Alkylation/Dimersol
RMP ID:
1000083551
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
1,800,000
No
Ammonia (anhydrous)
7664-41-7
18,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Hydrocracker
RMP ID:
1000083552
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Ammonia (anhydrous)
7664-41-7
20,000
No
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
264,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Mogas Reformulation Unit
RMP ID:
1000083553
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
230,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Pipestill/VLE
RMP ID:
1000083554
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
484,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
FCCU/CLE
RMP ID:
1000083555
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
1,050,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel
RMP ID:
1000083556
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
11,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Butamer
RMP ID:
1000083557
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
180,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Coker
RMP ID:
1000083558
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
13,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Cat Feed Hydrofiner
RMP ID:
1000083559
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
15,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No
Naptha Reformer Unit
RMP ID:
1000083560
CBI claimed:
No
Program Level:
3
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Chemical name
CAS#
Quantity (lbs.)
CBI
Flammable Mixture
00-11-11
180,000
No
Public OCA Chemical
0
No

RMP Preparer:

Name:
Address:

,
Foreign Address:

Phone:

Latest RMP Submission:

Date:
Nov. 2, 2017
Type:
Resubmission
Reason:
Voluntary update (not described by any of the above reasons)
Registered:
Yes
RMP ID:
1000066649

Deregistration:

Date:
Effective Date:
Reason:
Other Reason:

2. Toxics: Worst-case

Some Risk Management Plan information is not provided in the available RMP data. You need to make an appointment at an EPA Reading Room In order to get access to details from the Off-Site Consequence Analysis (OCA) such as:

Instructions on how to make an EPA appointment can be found here.

Public OCA Chemical (in Tank Storage)
CBI claimed:
No
Percent weight:
30.0
Physical state:
Liquid
Model used:
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Release duration (mins):
10.00
Wind speed (meters per sec):
1.5
Stability class:
F
Topography:
Urban
Passive mitigation
considered:
  • None
not considered:
  • Dikes
  • Enclosures
  • Berms
  • Drains
  • Sumps

3. Toxics: Alternative release

Some Risk Management Plan information is not provided in the available RMP data. You need to make an appointment at an EPA Reading Room In order to get access to details from the Off-Site Consequence Analysis (OCA) such as:

Instructions on how to make an EPA appointment can be found here.

Public OCA Chemical (in Tank Storage)
CBI claimed:
No
Percent weight:
30.0
Physical state:
Liquid
Model used:
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Wind speed (meters per sec):
3.00
Stability class:
F
Topography:
Urban
Passive mitigation
considered:
  • None
not considered:
  • Dikes
  • Enclosures
  • Berms
  • Drains
  • Sumps
Active mitigation
considered:
  • Excess flow valve
not considered:
  • Sprinkler systems
  • Deluge systems
  • Water curtain
  • Neutralization
  • Flares
  • Scrubbers
  • Emergency shutdown
Public OCA Chemical (in Hydrocracker)
CBI claimed:
No
Percent weight:
100.0
Physical state:
Gas liquified by pressure
Model used:
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Wind speed (meters per sec):
3.00
Stability class:
F
Topography:
Urban
Passive mitigation
considered:
  • None
not considered:
  • Dikes
  • Enclosures
  • Berms
  • Drains
  • Sumps
Active mitigation
considered:
  • Excess flow valve
not considered:
  • Sprinkler systems
  • Deluge systems
  • Water curtain
  • Neutralization
  • Flares
  • Scrubbers
  • Emergency shutdown

4. Flammables: Worst-case

Some Risk Management Plan information is not provided in the available RMP data. You need to make an appointment at an EPA Reading Room In order to get access to details from the Off-Site Consequence Analysis (OCA) such as:

Instructions on how to make an EPA appointment can be found here.

Public OCA Chemical (in Tank Storage)
CBI claimed:
No
Model used:
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Passive mitigation
considered:
  • None
not considered:
  • Blast walls

5. Flammables: Alternative release

Some Risk Management Plan information is not provided in the available RMP data. You need to make an appointment at an EPA Reading Room In order to get access to details from the Off-Site Consequence Analysis (OCA) such as:

Instructions on how to make an EPA appointment can be found here.

Public OCA Chemical (in Tank Storage)
CBI claimed:
No
Model used:
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Passive mitigation
considered:
  • Dikes
not considered:
  • Fire wall
  • Blast walls
  • Enclosures
Active mitigation
considered:
  • None
not considered:
  • Sprinkler systems
  • Deluge systems
  • Water curtain
  • Excess flow valve

6. Five-year accident history

May 5, 2017 at 06:42
ID:
1000051800
NAICS:
Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Duration:
318 hours and 41 minutes
Chemicals involved:
  • Sulfur dioxide (anhydrous)
  • Hydrogen sulfide
  • Flammable Mixture
  • Hydrogen
  • Ammonia (anhydrous)
Release events:
Gas release
Fire
Weather conditions at time of event
Wind speed:
14.0 miles/h NNW
Temperature:
61.00 ℉
Atmospheric stability:
C
Precipitation present:
No
Unknown weather conditions:
No
On-site impacts
Deaths of employees or contractors:
0
Deaths of public responders:
0
Deaths of public:
0
Injuries of employees or contractors:
0
Injuries of public responders:
0
Injuries of public:
0
Property damage:
$15900000
Known off-site impacts
Deaths:
0
Hospitalizations:
0
Medicals treatments:
68
Evacuated:
6500
Sheltered-in-place:
28174
Property damage:
$0
Environmental damage:
Initiating event:
Human Error
Contributing factors:
  • Equipment failure
  • Improper procedure
  • Maintenance activity/inactivity
Off-site responders notified:
Notified Only
Changes introduced as a result of the accident:
  • Revised training
  • Revised operating procedures
  • Revised emergency response plan
  • On planned basis re-engineer SPS system to provide higher system security. Review and update PG&E/Valero agreements to include required inspections, communication expectations, clearance coordination

7. Prevention: Program level 3

Tank Storage, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070419
Safety Review Date
Aug. 4, 2016
PHA Update Date
Nov. 11, 2015
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Vents
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Rupture Disks
  • Excess Flow Device
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • Perimeter Monitors
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Oct. 17, 2017
Training Review Date
Aug. 30, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
Aug. 4, 2016
Maintenance Inspection Date
Aug. 9, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
Aug. 4, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
Aug. 4, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
Aug. 4, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 9, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Aug. 1, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
Oct. 31, 2016
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Alkylation/Dimersol, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070420
Safety Review Date
Aug. 12, 2016
PHA Update Date
Nov. 2, 2015
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Runaway reaction
  • Polymerization
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Rupture Disks
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • None
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
  • Mitigation Systems
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Aug. 30, 2017
Training Review Date
Sept. 13, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
July 7, 2016
Maintenance Inspection Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
July 22, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
July 22, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
July 22, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 9, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Aug. 10, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
Dec. 31, 2016
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Hydrocracker, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070421
Safety Review Date
Sept. 12, 2016
PHA Update Date
April 11, 2014
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Runaway reaction
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Vents
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Rupture Disks
  • Excess Flow Device
  • Quench System
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • Process Area
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Sept. 8, 2017
Training Review Date
Sept. 27, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
Aug. 11, 2015
Maintenance Inspection Date
Oct. 3, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
Sept. 13, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
Sept. 13, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
Sept. 12, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 9, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Sept. 15, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Mogas Reformulation Unit, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070423
Safety Review Date
Aug. 29, 2016
PHA Update Date
June 5, 2013
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Runaway reaction
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Rupture Disks
  • Excess Flow Device
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • None
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Aug. 25, 2017
Training Review Date
Aug. 26, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
Feb. 22, 2016
Maintenance Inspection Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
Aug. 30, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
Aug. 30, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
Aug. 29, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 9, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
June 8, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Pipestill/VLE, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070422
Safety Review Date
Sept. 14, 2016
PHA Update Date
Nov. 7, 2013
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Vents
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Inhibitor Addition
  • Rupture Disks
  • Quench System
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • None
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Oct. 13, 2017
Training Review Date
Sept. 29, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
July 20, 2016
Maintenance Inspection Date
Oct. 1, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
Sept. 30, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
Sept. 30, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
Sept. 14, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 9, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Oct. 4, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
FCCU/CLE, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070424
Safety Review Date
Sept. 16, 2016
PHA Update Date
Aug. 2, 2017
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Inhibitor Addition
  • Rupture Disks
  • Excess Flow Device
  • Quench System
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • Process Area
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Aug. 18, 2017
Training Review Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
July 27, 2016
Maintenance Inspection Date
Aug. 10, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
June 24, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
June 24, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
Sept. 16, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 9, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Sept. 29, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070425
Safety Review Date
June 2, 2016
PHA Update Date
Sept. 21, 2016
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Vents
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Rupture Disks
  • Excess Flow Device
  • Quench System
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • Process Area
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Aug. 25, 2017
Training Review Date
Aug. 26, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
March 29, 2016
Maintenance Inspection Date
Aug. 24, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
May 27, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
May 27, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
June 2, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 9, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Nov. 17, 2014
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Butamer, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070426
Safety Review Date
May 23, 2016
PHA Update Date
Oct. 3, 2013
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Vents
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Rupture Disks
  • Excess Flow Device
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • Process Area
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Aug. 25, 2017
Training Review Date
Sept. 13, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
March 30, 2015
Maintenance Inspection Date
June 2, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
May 23, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
May 23, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
May 23, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 4, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Aug. 8, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Coker, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070427
Safety Review Date
July 25, 2016
PHA Update Date
Dec. 11, 2013
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Vents
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Rupture Disks
  • Excess Flow Device
  • Quench System
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • Process Area
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Aug. 8, 2017
Training Review Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
March 5, 2014
Maintenance Inspection Date
July 14, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
July 26, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
July 26, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
July 25, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 4, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Sept. 12, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Cat Feed Hydrofiner, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070428
Safety Review Date
Aug. 30, 2016
PHA Update Date
Dec. 19, 2013
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Vents
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Rupture Disks
  • Excess Flow Device
  • Quench System
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • Process Area
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
  • On the Job
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
Aug. 18, 2017
Training Review Date
Sept. 11, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
July 12, 2013
Maintenance Inspection Date
Sept. 6, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
Sept. 2, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
Sept. 2, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
Aug. 30, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 9, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Aug. 25, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016
Naptha Reformer Unit, Petroleum Refineries (32411)
Prevention Program ID:
1000070429
Safety Review Date
Aug. 30, 2016
PHA Update Date
April 10, 2013
PHA Techniques
  • HAZOP
Hazards Identified
  • Toxic release
  • Fire
  • Explosion
  • Overpressurization
  • Corrosion
  • Overfilling
  • Contamination
  • Equipment failure
  • Cooling loss
  • Earthquake
Process Controls
  • Vents
  • Relief Valves
  • Check Valves
  • Flares
  • Manual Shutoffs
  • Automatic Shutoffs
  • Interlocks
  • Alarms
  • Keyed Bypass
  • Emergency Air Supply
  • Emergency Power
  • Backup Pump
  • Grounding Equipment
  • Rupture Disks
  • Excess Flow Device
  • Quench System
  • Purge System
Mitigation Systems
  • None
Monitoring Systems
  • Process Area
Changes since PHA
  • Process Controls
Training Type
  • Classrom
Competency Testing
  • Written Test
  • Demonstration
  • Observation
Procedure Review Date
July 26, 2017
Training Review Date
Aug. 26, 2016
Maintenance Review Date
April 14, 2015
Maintenance Inspection Date
Sept. 22, 2016
Equipment Tested
Yes
Management of Change Most Recent Date
Aug. 30, 2016
Management of Change Review Date
Aug. 30, 2016
Pre-startup Review Date
Aug. 30, 2016
Compliance Audit Date
May 9, 2017
Compliance Audit Change Completion Date
Aug. 11, 2019
Incident Investigation Date
Sept. 12, 2016
Incident Invest. Change Completion Date
None
Participation Plan Review Date
July 29, 2014
Hot Work Review Date
May 1, 2016
Contractor Safety Review Date
July 29, 2016
Contractor Safety Eval. Date
Sept. 1, 2016

8. Prevention Program level 2

No Prevention Program level 2

9. Emergency response

Facility In Community Plan:
Yes
Facility Own Response Plan:
No
Specific Facility Response Plan:
Yes
Inform. Procedures in Response Plan:
No
Emergency Care in Response Plan:
Yes
Plan Review Date:
Response Training Date:
Oct. 10, 2016
Local Response Agency:
Local Response Agency Phone:
(707) 746-4275
Subject To - OSHA EAP:
No
Subject To - OSHA HAZWOPER:
Yes
Subject To - CWA:
No
Subject To - RCRA:
Yes
Subject To - OPA:
No
Subject To - State EPCRA:
Yes
Subject To - Other:

Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PREVENTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE POLICIES



The Valero Benicia Refinery operates under a structured Process Safety Management (PSM) system where there is an assigned Management Sponsor and System Administrator for each PSM element.



The Valero Benicia Refinery has a long-standing commitment to employee and public safety and protecting the environment. This commitment is demonstrated by the resources invested in accident prevention, such as personnel training and considering safety in the design, installation, operation, and maintenance of our processes. Our objective is to implement reasonable controls to prevent foreseeable releases of regulated substances. However, if a release does occur, our trained personnel will respond to control, contain and mitigate the release.





DESCRIPTION OF THE STATIONARY SOURCE AND REGULATED SUBSTANCES



The Valero Benicia Refinery, located in Benicia, California, U.S.A., operates a variety of processes to produce petroleum products (e.g., propane, butane, gasoline products, jet fuels, diesel fuels, asphalt and coke) from raw crude oil. The refinery has several regulated flammables, such as propane, butane, etc. In addition, the refinery uses and/or processes anhydrous ammonia and aqueous ammonia (>20%), which are toxic regulated substances. The Refinery contains a total of eight covered processes for the purposes of this plan. The predictive filing box was marked for anhydrous ammonia.



EXTERNAL EVENTS ANALYSIS



The refinery is subject to external events, which may cause the release of hazardous materials. The refinery is designed and operated in such a way as to minimize the probability and the impact of such events. External events considered in the design and operation of the refinery include, but are not limited to: security, temperature extremes, earthquake, winds, precipitation, utility disruption, and wildland fires.



Of particular interest is the earthquake suscept
ibility. The refinery was built in the late 1960's to the best ground motion technology available at the time. Additionally, most of the refinery processing and storage areas are on solid rock, which limits the severity of ground motion. Additions and significant modifications to the Refinery since that time have been done using the codes and technology applicable at the time of construction of those projects. Even prior to the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, the refinery had conducted independent assessments of risks associated with lateral ground motion. Although there will be damage to refinery equipment from a worst credible earthquake, studies have indicated that catastrophic loss of containment should not be a concern.



With the advent of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City, the refinery has done detailed evaluations of its physical security facilities and associated security plans. Both have been significantly updated to address issues identified in these evaluations, and they meet all federal requirements for marine and fuels terminals. In addition, the refinery has maintained strong links with local and national law enforcement agencies to ensure good coordination in the event of an incident.



GENERAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PREVENTION PROGRAM STEPS



The following is a summary of the general accident prevention program in place at the Valero Benicia Refinery. EPA's Program 3 prevention requirements are met because all Program Level 3 processes at the refinery are also subject to the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) standard.



The refinery is focused on fuels production and most of the light hydrocarbons are used in mixtures and are not recovered as pure components. Isomers and olefins of propane and butane origin are mixed without regard to the specific components, because they all behave similarly in their use as fuel. Where we had specific gas chromatograph information on the species of the hydrocarbon compounds, these have be
en marked in the inventory. If these data were not readily available, only the normal paraffinic component (propane, butane) is listed. In all cases, the normal paraffinic component is less dense but has a higher energy value than the olefins or isomers, and therefore, represents a more conservative case.



Additional details are included in the Data Element section of this RMPlan. Due to the ongoing nature of our safety program, the dates associated with the various activities in our accident prevention program are constantly changing. To minimize rework, October 7, 2016 (estimated 45 days prior to expected submittal date)was selected as the date to end collecting information regarding the 2016 voluntary update resubmission. Consequently, most of the reviews/updates conducted after that date are not reflected in the Data Element information.



Employee Participation



The Valero Benicia Refinery encourages employees to participate in all facets of process safety management and accident prevention. Examples of employee participation range from updating and compiling operating and maintenance procedures to participating as a member of a process hazard analysis (PHA) team. Employees have access to the information used to create the refinery accident prevention program. Specific ways that employees can be involved in the accident prevention program are documented in an employee participation plan that is maintained at the refinery and addresses each accident prevention program element. In addition, the refinery has a number of safety committees and forums that employees can use to address their process and personnel safety issues. The teams typically have members from various areas of the plant, including operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant management.



The refinery attained the California OSHA Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) Star status in 2006. Cal/VPP is designed to recognize safety and health systems that effectively prevent and contro
l occupational hazards. These systems go beyond ensuring that the minimal Cal/OSHA standards are met by providing the best feasible protection at that site. The Benicia refinery has retained its' VPP Star status since that time, being recertified in March, 2014 for the next 3 years. A review of the PSM systems were included as part of each VPP recertification review.



The refinery implemented a behavior based safety program called Safety Needs Active Participation (SNAP) in 2005. The purpose of this program is to reduce at-risk behaviors and remove barriers to safe behaviors, thus improving safety performance. Peer observations are anonymous and confidential. The SNAP observers strive to be safety role models supporting continuous improvement processes at Valero Benicia Refinery.





Process Safety Information



The Valero Benicia Refinery keeps a variety of technical documents that are used to help maintain safe operation of the processes. These documents address chemical properties and associated hazards, limits for key process parameters and specific chemical inventories, and equipment design basis/configuration information. Specific groups within the refinery are assigned responsibility for maintaining up-to-date process safety information. A table summarizing the reference documents and their location is readily available as part of the PSM documentation to help employees locate any necessary process safety information.



Chemical-specific information, including exposure hazards and emergency response/exposure treatment considerations, is provided in Safety Data Sheets (SDSs). This information is supplemented by documents that specifically address known corrosion concerns and any known hazards associated with the inadvertent mixing of chemicals. For specific process areas, the refinery has identified operating envelopes; i.e. documented safety-related limits for specific process parameters such as temperature, level, and compositions. The refine
ry ensures that the process is maintained within these limits using computerized process controls and monitoring instruments, highly trained personnel, and protective instrumented systems (e.g., automated shutdown systems, alarm systems).



The refinery also maintains numerous technical documents that provide information about the design and construction of process equipment. This information includes materials of construction, design pressure and temperature ratings, electrical rating of equipment, etc. This information, in combination with written procedures and trained personnel, provides a basis for establishing inspection and maintenance activities, as well as for evaluating proposed process and facility changes to ensure that safety features in the process are not compromised.



Process Hazard Analysis



The Valero Benicia Refinery has a comprehensive program to help ensure that hazards associated with the various processes are identified and controlled. Within this program, each process is systematically examined to identify hazards and ensure that adequate controls are in place to manage these hazards.



The Valero Benicia Refinery primarily uses the guideword based Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study methodology. HAZOP analysis is recognized as one of the most systematic and thorough hazard evaluation techniques. The analyses are conducted using a team of people who have operating experience and engineering expertise on the process to be evaluated. This PHA team identifies and evaluates hazards of the process as well as accident prevention and mitigation measures, and makes suggestions for additional prevention and/or mitigation measures when the team believes such measures are necessary.



The PHA team findings are reviewed with local management for resolution. Implementation of mitigation options in response to PHA findings is based on a relative risk evaluation done by the PHA team. The evaluation helps to ensure that potential accident sce
narios assigned greater risk receive attention first. Some mitigation options, though, may involve process modifications that can only be implemented during a complete shutdown of the covered process. Implementation of such modifications may extend well into the future and are subject to change. All approved mitigation options being implemented in response to PHA team findings are tracked until they are complete. The resolution of each finding is documented and retained.



To ensure that the process controls and/or process hazards do not deviate significantly from the original design safety features, the Valero Benicia Refinery periodically updates and revalidates the hazard analysis results. These periodic reviews are conducted at least every 5 years for the life of the process. The results and findings from these updates are documented and retained. The team findings are forwarded to management for consideration, and resolution of the findings is documented and retained.



Operating Procedures and Safe Work Practices



The Valero Benicia Refinery maintains written procedures that address various modes of process operations, such as (1) startup, (2) shutdown, (3), normal and (4) emergency operations. These procedures can be used as a reference by experienced operators and provide a consistent basis for training of new operators. The procedures are maintained current and accurate by revising them as necessary to reflect changes made through the management of change process. These procedures are periodically reviewed and annually certified as current and accurate.



The refinery has identified Operating Envelopes; i.e. documented safety-related limits for specific process parameters such as temperature, level, and compositions. This information, along with written operating procedures, is readily available to operators in the process unit and for other personnel to use as necessary to safely perform their job tasks.



Training



To complement the w
ritten procedures for process operations, the Valero Benicia Refinery has implemented a comprehensive training program for all employees involved in operating a process. New employees receive basic training in refinery operations and safety. After successfully completing this training, a new operator is paired with an experienced operator to learn process-specific duties and tasks. After employees demonstrate (e.g., through tests, skills demonstration) having adequate knowledge to perform the duties and tasks in a safe manner on their own, they can work independently. In addition, all operations personnel periodically receive refresher training on the operating procedures to ensure that their skills and knowledge are maintained at an acceptable level. This refresher training is conducted at least every 3 years. All of this training is documented for each operator, including the means used to verify that the operator understood the training.



Contractors



The Valero Benicia Refinery uses contractors to supplement its' workforce during periods of increased maintenance or construction activities. Because some contractors work to support on-going operations and on or near process equipment, the refinery has procedures in place to ensure that contractors (1) perform their work in a safe manner, (2) have the appropriate knowledge and skills, (3) are aware of the hazards in their workplace, (4) understand what they should do in the event of an emergency, (5) understand and follow site safety rules, and (6) inform refinery personnel of any hazards that they find during their work. This is accomplished by providing contractors with (1) a process overview, (2) information about safety and health hazards, (3) emergency response plan requirements, and (4) safe work practices prior to their beginning work. In addition, the Valero Benicia Refinery evaluates contractor safety programs and performance during the selection of a contractor. Refinery personnel periodical
ly monitor contractor performance to ensure that contractors are fulfilling their safety obligations.



Pre-startup Safety Reviews (PSSRs)



The Valero Benicia Refinery conducts a PSSR for any new facility or facility modification that requires a change in the process safety information and therefore, is controlled by management of change (MOC). The purpose of the PSSR is to ensure that safety features, procedures, personnel, and the equipment are appropriately prepared for startup prior to placing the equipment into service. This review provides one additional check to make sure construction is in accordance with the design specifications and that all supporting systems are operationally ready. The PSSR review team uses checklists to verify all aspects of readiness. A PSSR involves field verification of the construction and serves as a quality assurance function by requiring verification that accident prevention program requirements are properly implemented.



Mechanical Integrity



The Valero Benicia Refinery has well-established practices and procedures to maintain pressure vessels, piping systems, relief and vent systems, controls, pumps and compressors, and emergency shutdown systems in a safe operating condition. The basic aspects of this program include: (1) conducting training, (2) developing written procedures, (3) performing inspections and tests, (4) correcting identified deficiencies, and (5) applying quality assurance measures. In combination, these activities form a system that maintains the mechanical integrity of the process equipment.



Maintenance personnel receive training on (1) an overview of the process, (2) safety and health hazards, (3) applicable maintenance procedures, (4) emergency response plans, and (5) applicable safe work practices to help ensure that they can perform their job in a safe manner. Written procedures help ensure that work is performed in a consistent manner and provide a basis for training. Inspections and te
sts are performed to help ensure that equipment functions as intended, and to verify that equipment is within acceptable limits (e.g., adequate wall thickness for pressure vessels). If a deficiency is identified, employees will address the deficiency before placing the equipment back into service.



Another integral part of the mechanical integrity program is quality assurance. The Valero Benicia Refinery incorporates quality assurance measures into equipment purchases and repairs. This helps ensure that new equipment is suitable for its intended use and that proper materials and spare parts are used when repairs are made.



Hot Work & Other Safe Work Practices



The Valero Benicia Refinery has long-standing safe work practices in place to help ensure worker and process safety. These include orientations for visitors/contractors, control of the entry/presence/exit of personnel, energy isolation for equipment being worked on, procedures for the safe removal of hazardous materials before opening of process piping/equipment, hot work permit/procedure to safely manage spark-producing activities, vehicle entry into process area, confined space entry permit/procedure to help ensure precautions are taken before entering confined spaces, and job safety analyses to identify and mitigate hazards associated with maintenance tasks. These practices, along with related procedures and training of affected personnel, form a system to help ensure operations and maintenance activities are performed safely.



Management of Change



The Valero Benicia Refinery has a comprehensive system to manage changes to processes. This system requires that changes to items such as process equipment, chemicals, technology (including process operating conditions), procedures, and other facility changes be properly reviewed and authorized before being implemented. Changes are reviewed by Subject Matter Experts to (1) ensure that adequate controls are in place to manage any new hazards and
(2) verify that existing controls have not been compromised by the change. Affected chemical hazard information, process operating limits, and equipment information, as well as procedures are updated to incorporate these changes. In addition, operating and maintenance personnel are provided any necessary training before the change is implemented.



Incident Investigation



The Valero Benicia Refinery promptly investigates all incidents that resulted in, or reasonably could have resulted in, a fire/explosion, toxic gas release, major property damage, environmental loss, or personal injury. The goal of each investigation is to determine the facts and develop corrective actions to prevent a recurrence of the incident or a similar incident. The investigation team documents its findings, develops recommendations to prevent a recurrence, and forwards these results to refinery management for resolution. Corrective actions taken in response to the investigation team's findings and recommendations are tracked until they are complete. The resolution of each finding or recommendation is documented, and the investigation results are communicated to employees (including contractors) who could be affected by the findings. Incident investigation reports are retained for at least 5 years so that the reports can be reviewed during future PHAs and PHA revalidations.



Compliance Audits



To help ensure that the accident prevention program is functioning properly, the Valero Benicia Refinery periodically conducts audits to determine whether the procedures and practices required by the accident prevention program are being implemented. Independent, 3rd party compliance audits are conducted at least every 3 years. The audit teams develop findings that are forwarded to refinery management for resolution. Corrective actions taken in response to the audit team's findings are tracked until they are complete. The resolution of each finding is documented, and the two most rece
nt audit reports are retained.



CHEMICAL SPECIFIC PREVENTION STEPS



The processes at the Valero Benicia Refinery have hazards that must be managed to ensure continued safe operation. The accident prevention program summarized previously is applied to all covered processes at the Valero Benicia Refinery. Collectively, these prevention program activities help prevent potential accident scenarios that could be caused by (1) equipment failures and (2) human errors.



In addition to the accident prevention program activities, the Valero Benicia Refinery has safety features on many units to help, (1) quickly detect a release, (2) contain/control a release and (3) reduce the consequences of (mitigate) a release. The following types of safety features are used in various processes:



Release Detection



1. Hydrocarbon detectors with alarms



2. Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) detectors with alarms



3. TV surveillance cameras



Release Containment/Control



1. Process relief valves that discharge to a flare to capture and recover or incinerate episodic releases



2. Valves to permit isolation of the process (manual or automated)



3. Automated shutdown systems for specific process parameters (e.g., high level, high temperature)



4. Curbing or diking to contain liquid releases



5. Redundant equipment and instrumentation (e.g., uninterruptible power supply for process control system, backup firewater pump)



6. Atmospheric relief devices



Release Mitigation



1. Fire suppression and extinguishing systems



2. Deluge system for specific equipment



3. Trained emergency response personnel



4. Personal protective equipment (e.g., protective clothing, self-contained breathing apparatus)



5. Blast-resistant buildings to help protect control systems and personnel



FIVE-YEAR ACCIDENT HISTORY



The Valero Benicia Refinery has an excellent record of accident prevention over the life of the refinery. There is one incident reported in the 5 year accident history
. On May 5, 2017, there was a sudden, immediate and total loss of PG&E 230 kV power that resulted in the immediate and unplanned shutdown of the entire refinery. This resulted in a flaring release of 74,420 pounds SO2 until the refinery was shutdown safely. Additionally, 2 units had atmospheric safety valves lift and released 10,200 pounds combustible and flammable mixtures and 10 pounds combined of Ammonia, Hydrogen and H2S. No one offsite was admitted to the hospital; the nearby elementary schools performed a precautionary shelter-in-place; and the business park was evacuated as a precaution, although several business park personnel chose to shelter-in-place.





EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM INFORMATION



The Valero Benicia Refinery maintains a written emergency response program, which is in place to protect worker and public safety as well as the environment. The program consists of procedures for responding to a release of a regulated substance, including the possibility of a fire or explosion if a flammable substance is accidentally released. The procedures address all aspects of emergency response, including proper first-aid and medical treatment for exposures, evacuation plans and accounting for personnel after an evacuation, notification of local emergency response agencies and the public if a release occurs, and post incident cleanup and decontamination requirements. In addition, the Valero Benicia Refinery has procedures that address maintenance, inspection, and testing of emergency response equipment, as well as instructions that address the use of emergency response equipment. Employees receive training in these procedures as necessary to perform their specific emergency response duties. The emergency response program is updated when necessary based on modifications made to refinery processes or other refinery facilities. The emergency response program changes are administered through the MOC process, which includes informing and/or training affe
cted personnel in the changes.



The Valero Benicia Refinery maintains an onsite fire department with first responders on-site 24 hours per day. The overall emergency response program for the Valero Benicia Refinery is coordinated with the Solano County Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC). This coordination includes periodic meetings of the committee, which includes local emergency response officials, local government officials, and industry representatives. The Valero Benicia Refinery has around-the-clock communications capability with appropriate LEPC officials and emergency response organizations (e.g., City of Benicia Fire Department). This provides a means of notifying the public of an incident as well as facilitating quick response to an incident. In addition to periodic LEPC meetings, the Valero Benicia Refinery conducts periodic emergency drills that involve the City of Benicia Fire Department.



PLANNED CHANGES TO IMPROVE SAFETY



The Process Safety Management systems form the cornerstone for continuous improvement in our safety-related systems. These systems are evergreen and are in a continuous state of improvement, usually through many small improvement steps. Some examples are the recommendations from our hazard reviews and any incident investigations. Other examples are the improvement steps that result from our operating and mechanical procedures systems that are tightly integrated with our training programs.



As noted earlier, the Valero Benicia Refinery has been certified as a CAL/OSHA VPP Star Site since 2006. As part of the CAL/VPP process, an annual assessment is required documenting the continuous improvement made with the safety and health systems. An onsite visit by CalOSHA is conducted every three years to review the progress. In addition, the refinery's behavior based safety observation process SNAP, continues to identify and remove barriers to safe behaviors of employees and contractors.